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RIGHT TO TESTIFY
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
N. Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall
be allowed to appear and. defend in person and with
counsel.., and be confronted with the witnesses against
him ... No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Mason'
(decided February 29, 2000)
The defendant was charged with one count of criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree and two counts of
criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and was
convicted as charged by the jury in the Supreme Court.2 The
defendant appealed from this judgment, arguing that there was a
"fundamental error of constitutional law concerning defendant's
right to testify," and that this error cannot be considered harmless. 3
The appellate cout reversed the lower court's decision and
remanded the case for a new trial, finding reversible error and
enormous prejudice to the defendant.4
At the close of the case, the defendant informed the court
that he wanted to testify, but his counsel had advised him against
263 A.D.2d 73, 706 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 2000).
2 Id. at 74, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
3Id.
4 Id. at 73, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
1
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it.5 The court stated that if defendant testified on his own behalf,
he would be cross-examined about statements that he made after he
was arrested implying his guilt.6 The court also noted the fact that
the defendant made a statement commending his counsel on her
wise decision not to allow him to testify.7 However, the defendant
himself noted his objection for the court.8 When the jury returned
to the courtroom, counsel approached the bench and the judge
decided that the court was not responsible for ordering the
defendant to testify against counsel's decision.9 After defense
counsel delivered her summation, the defendant stated to the jury
that the information they heard was not true and he wanted to tell
them his side of the story, but was not permitted to do so."° The
story that the defendant. denied, and that the jury heard, was that
the two officers, who testified at trial, were on patrol on the night
in question, and saw a woman running toward them. 1 The woman
pointed at the defendant and yelled that he had a gun. The
defendant stopped and looked as if he was "discarding an object"
and ran away. The officers found the defendant hiding under a
parked car. He had an empty holster that was manufactured for
semiautomatic weapons, and a loaded semiautomatic gun was
found in the area where defendant was seen discarding an object.13
The defendant was then arrested. 14
' Id. at 75, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3. The jury was not in the courtroom at the time.
Id.
6 Id.
7 Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 75, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
8 Id.
9 Id. The court further held that:
[U]nder the circumstances since you think it's in his best
interests given what we know maybe [sic] revealed upon his
cross examination, that I will go with your judgment... I
don't think that the rule that he must testify is entirely absolute
and this case may be unique enough to amplify why it
shouldn't be entirely absolute.
Id.
'0 Id. at 76, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
' Id. at 74-75, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
12 Id.
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After the defendant's outburst in court, the judge allowed
the defendant to testify. The defense counsel made it clear, in the
presence of the jury, that the judge's decision was over her
objection.1 5 The defendant's side of the story was that "he and a
friend were sitting on a car... [and] when [the] police officers
approached and searched them.., the officers showed defendant a
gun and told him he had dropped it and that he was being arrested
for gun possession.' 16 One of the officers rebutted, testifying "that
defendant told him that the woman he was chasing was... his
wife,.., that defendant had chased her because she had 'pissed
[him] off, and that he wasn't going to hurt her and only wanted to
scare her."'
' 17
The issue that the court considered was "whether a
fundamental error of constitutional law concerning the defendant's
right to testify ... ultimately resulted in prejudice to defendant
which cannot be deemed harmless and is sufficient to warrant a
new trial.' In this case the court analyzed the due process right
to testify that is guaranteed under both the Federal' 9 and New York
State20 Constitutions, as well as § 260.3021 of the Criminal
15 Id. at 76, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
16 Id.
17 id.
18 Id. at 74, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
20 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In any trial
in any court whatever fle party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel... and be confronted with the witnesses against
him... No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." Id.
N.Y. CRiM. PROC. § 260.30. This statute provides in pertinent part:
The order of a jury trial, in general, is as follows:
1. The jury must be selected and sworn.
2. The court rnust deliver preliminary instructions to the jury.
3. The people must deliver an opening address to the jury.
4. The defendant may deliver an opening address to the jury.
2000
3
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Procedure Law (CPL) that "sets forth the order in which a jury trial
is to proceed. ' 22  However, when deciding whether the lower
court's decision was harmless, "the law, the evidence and the
unique circumstances of each particular case must be viewed as a
whole."
23
In the case at bar, the appellate court analyzed the decision
in People v. Burke.24 There, the appellate court found that "[t]he
magnitude and fundamental nature of one's right to be heard in
criminal proceedings pending against him compels a finding that
the error cannot be found harmless .... 25 The defendant was
convicted of promoting prison contraband in the first degree.26 He
contended that he was denied the right to testify on his own
behalf.27 Defense counsel had advised against testifying, and the
defendant went back and forth on the issue, eventually seeking to
testify after the defense rested.28 Counsel moved to reopen, but the
motion was denied.29
5. The people must offer evidence in support of the
indictment.
6. The defendant may offer evidence in his defense.
7. The people may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defense
evidence, and the defendant may then offer evidence in
rebuttal of the people's rebuttal evidence. The court may in its
discretion permit the parties to offer further rebuttal or
surrebuttal evidence in this pattern. In the interest of justice,
the court may permit either party to offer evidence upon
rebuttal which is not technically of a rebuttal nature but more
properly a part of the offering party's original case.
8. At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant may
deliver a summation to the jury.
9. The people may then deliver a summation to the jury.
10. The court must then deliver a charge to the jury.
11. The jury must then retire to deliberate and, if possible,
render a verdict.
Id.
22 Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 76-77, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3, 4.
23 Id. at 78, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 5. (holding that "[t]here is... no set litmus test for
determining what constitutes ineffective or inadequate legal representation. .
24 179 A.D.2d 994, 574 N.Y.S.2d 859 (3d Dep't 1991).
25 Id. at 1001, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
26 Id. at 1000, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
27 id.
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In People v. Harami,30 there is a similar outcome. The
defendant had requested to take the stand and the trial court denied
the request, noting counsel's advice not to testify, as well as the
negativity of cross-examination. 31 The appellate court in Harami
found "that the trial court abused its discretion... by denying
defendant's request to take the stand and testify in his own
behalf. 3
2
The error in the case at bar, like those in Burke and
Harami, is "clearly of a constitutional nature and in order for such
error to be deemed harmless, there must be no reasonable
possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant's
conviction and it aust be found harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."
33
When analyzing CPL § 260.30, the appellate court in
Mason found that "'[i]n the absence of a compelling reason to do
so, the order of trial prescribed by CPL 260.30 should be adhered
to."' 34  The lower court in Mason deviated from the statutorily
delineated order of trial, and was unable to cure that error by
allowing the defendant to eventually testify at an improper stage. W
In People v. Farrow,36 the appellate court found no abuse
of discretion by the lower court, or violation of CPL 260.30, when
it refused to reopen the trial in order for the defendant to testify.37
However, Farrow can be distinguished from the case at bar
because the defendant in Farrow requested to testify only after
summations and during the jury charge, but in the case at bar, the
defendant began his request at an earlier stage of trial. 38 "The
order of proof, as set forth in CPL 260.30, may be varied by the
trial court 'in its discretion in furtherance of justice.' 39
"Nevertheless, 'the order of trial prescribed by statute should be
30 93 A.D.2d 867, 461 N.Y.S.2d 376 (2d Dep't 1983).
31 id.
32 Id. at 868, 461 N.Y.S.2d 376.
33 Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 77, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
34 Id.; N.Y. CRiM. PROC. § 260.30.
31 Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 77, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
36 176 A.D.2d 130, 574 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't 1991).
37 Id.
38 Id.; Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 75, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
39 Farrow, 176 A.D.2d at 130, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (quoting People v. Benham,
160 N.Y. 402, 55 N.E. 11 (1899)).
2000
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followed unless there is a showing of a compelling reason for a
variation.' 
40
The dissenting opinion in the case at bar indicated that
trials are never perfect and errors are practically unavoidable, but
41that most errors can be cured by subsequent remedial measures.
The dissent states that the initial error of precluding the defendant
from testifying was cured by the remedial measure of allowing him
to testify at a later point.42
However, the majority held that the trial court's actions
"resulted in defendant testifying under haphazard and somewhat
confusing conditions, result[ing] in enormous prejudice to
defendant .... It appears likely, after the [defendant's] outburst,
that the jury may very well have concluded that neither the court,
nor his own attorney, had faith in his story. 4 3
The defense counsel's misunderstanding of this important
constitutional right to testify led directly to the defendant's
prejudice. 4  Therefore, the error of the lower court cannot be
deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.45
In sum, the New York State Constitution is more specific
when it states, "[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel.., and be confronted with the witnesses against him,' 4 7
and therefore more relevant to the case at bar. However, the right
to testify is "[o]ne of the fundamental precepts of due process," 48
and is guaranteed under both the Federal49 and New York State50
Constitutions. Thus, the analysis of the lower court's decision
reveals that the denial of the defendant's Federal and State
40 Id. (quoting People v. Theriault, 75 A.D.2d 971, 428 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980)).
4, Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 81, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 7 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
41 Id. at 77-78, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
44 Id. at 79, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
41 Id. at 77, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
46 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
47 Id.
48 Mason, 263 A.D.2d at 76, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
[Vol 17
6
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constitutional right to testify resulted in reversible error and a new
trial.5"
Kathleen Byrne
51 See Mason, 263 A.D.2d 73, 706 N.Y.S.2d 1.
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